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## Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean Basin: Perspectives to the Year 2000

A Conference Report  
by  
Lloyd Searwar



Proceedings of a Conference held in Kingston, Jamaica  
March 22-25, 1987

in collaboration with

**the Institute for Social and Economic Research,  
the Institute for International Relations, UWI,**


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## Preface

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One of the purposes of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security is to encourage research into new approaches to global peace and security. With this aim in view, the Institute joined with the International Peace Academy of New York to explore the question of the future security of the small, independent states in the Caribbean region. The project was inspired by the findings of the Commonwealth report, **Vulnerability, Small States in the Global Society**, published in 1985, and was designed to take the study a stage further by focussing on the region in which the majority of the small Commonwealth states are situated and where Canada has historic ties.

In order to do so, the Institute and the International Peace Academy sponsored a workshop with two institutes in the Caribbean, both part of the University of the West Indies: the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Jamaica, and the Institute of International Relations, Trinidad and Tobago. The workshop was held in Kingston, Jamaica, in March 1987, with some thirty participants (see Appendix I). The papers presented at the workshop are to be published in 1988 under the general editorship of Professor T. Shaw of Dalhousie University, Dr. E. Greene of ISER and Dr. A. Bryan of IIR.

In our deliberations we were confronted with varying perceptions of security; whether it should be defined in East-West terms or in North-South. We discovered a mix of views and concluded that in the Caribbean security was as much a matter of development as a reflection of the East-West conflict; and that the future of the Caribbean would rest on a successful resolution of both. The report of the workshop reflects these twin perspectives.

We wish to thank the Honourable Jeanette Grant-Woodham, Minister of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry, of Jamaica, and Professor Leslie R.B. Robinson, Acting Vice Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, who addressed the opening session of the workshop, as well as Dr. Edward Greene, Director of the ISER, who acted as host. The Minister's speech is contained in Appendix III of this report. We are particularly grateful to Lloyd Searwar, formerly of the Caricom Secretariat and presently at IIR, who prepared this report of our discussions, to which he was also a major contributor.

Geoffrey Pearson

Indar Rikhye



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The events in the Caribbean Island of Grenada, in October 1983, focussed international attention on the security problems of small states. Meeting shortly thereafter in New Delhi, Commonwealth Heads of Government directed that a study should be undertaken of this problem. The recommendations of that study — **Vulnerability, Small States in the Global Society** — were endorsed by the Nassau Commonwealth Summit in October 1985, and will be reviewed at the forthcoming Heads of Government Meeting in Vancouver, in October 1987.

In March 1987, the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) and the International Peace Academy (IPA) co-sponsored a workshop with the University of the West Indies in Kingston, Jamaica to consider the issues raised in this Commonwealth report as they applied to the future of the Commonwealth Caribbean.

The participants recognized that the development and strategic problems of these small states were interrelated and were closely linked with geopolitical factors; they therefore considered a range of issues and problems which arose from both the external and national environments.

The findings of the workshop can be summarized as follows:

In seeking to develop their societies so as to meet the expectations of their people for a higher standard of living and to provide for a rapidly expanding work force, the small states of the Caribbean are faced with the following problems:

- externally, their location in a region of perceived geostrategic significance limits their freedom to choose whatever development strategies and external policies they prefer;
- internally, they have to deal with the problems which arise from:
  - a rapidly increasing work force expected to amount to an additional million by the end of the century;
  - the loss of the growth dynamic of their traditional industries which are in danger of collapsing;
  - their susceptibility to mercenary attacks or, in the case of multi-island states, to secessionist tendencies, and more recently to a modern manifestation of mercenary interests — the increasing infiltration and penetration of their societies by powerful drug-trafficking groups;
  - their smallness and, in the case of island states (a majority),

- geographical hazards (hurricanes) and fragile eco-systems;
- weak institutional and parliamentary structures incapable of providing effective support for the production or the redistribution of gains or the promotion of cohesiveness;
- the challenge by foreign electronic media to core national and cultural values.

Faced with a mounting debt crisis, and despite the clear need to pursue pragmatic approaches to development as dictated by their unique circumstances, the small Caribbean states are required to undertake adjustment strategies which may prevent the pursuit of programmes for growth, development and job creation. It is also possible that they may lose their eligibility for concessionary funding from international financial institutions, through the application of inappropriate criteria.

Yet the policy-makers of the small Caribbean states are not bereft of options for the future, both regional and international. The reorganization and strengthening of the regional integration movements (the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)) may make them more responsive to current needs and provide a countervailing factor in the management of unequal power relations. In particular the capacity of these institutions to implement declared regional strategies should be strengthened, wherever possible.

Further diplomatic collaboration with the states of the Caribbean littoral and with those middle powers which have traditional links with the region should be explored, in order to increase their chances of pursuing prudent development strategies of their choices.

It is important, however, in pursuing appropriate strategies, whether at national or regional levels, that the small states ensure that their choices are seen to respond to domestic imperatives and are not presented in ideological terms capable of being misinterpreted as taking sides in the East-West conflict.

While recognizing the nearly irreversible threat to their culture posed by foreign electronic media, the Caribbean small states should explore the possibilities for producing, both national and regionally, programme material and other cultural content which projects their own values. Where possible they could draw on material being produced by the Caribbean "diaspora" communities.

They should also examine to what extent multilateral assistance including help from the middle powers can be enlisted in support of existing defence arrangements. This will require careful study of the

scope and nature of the assistance available in existing bilateral, regional and other defence arrangements, as well as prior agreements on guidelines indicating in which situations such assistance should be sought.

In reviewing Canada's role in the region it was noted that in addition to its traditional role as an important aid donor, Canada could:

- if invited, expand its diplomatic role as an interpreter (especially to the international financial institutions) of the special needs of the Caribbean small states and re-evaluate the adequacy of existing consultative arrangements with the Caribbean;
- make its policies in the Caribbean more responsive to the interests of the large Caribbean immigrant communities in Canada;
- provide expanded institutional support and project assistance for the regional integration movements, in particular by supporting their capacity to implement decisions taken by regional bodies;
- provide assistance, as a Commonwealth state sharing similar institutions and values, in strengthening the institutional structures of the small states.

In the long term the Canadian role in the region might involve support for any federal or confederal arrangements that the Caribbean Community or the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States may choose to undertake. This support could be provided at the diplomatic level, but given Canada's longstanding political and technical experience of confederation what might be more important would be for Canada to provide technical support for, and advice on, initiatives for the promotion of political union, or any other closer association between the Caribbean small states.

## INTRODUCTION

The military intervention in Grenada in October 1983, which had been preceded by the assassination of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and a number of his colleagues, focussed international and, in particular, Commonwealth attention on the problems of small states. A decision was taken by Commonwealth Heads of Government, when they met in New Delhi in November 1983, to request the Commonwealth Secretary-General to undertake a study of the special needs, including the security needs, of small states not only in the Caribbean but elsewhere in the Commonwealth. This study — **Vulnerability, Small States in the Global Society** — and its recommendations were endorsed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government at their meeting in Nassau in October 1985; the implementation of these recommendations will be reviewed later this year in Vancouver.

In the Caribbean itself the tragic events in Grenada had a traumatic effect, confronting the regional leadership with political and moral dilemmas as to what should have been appropriate action. They have led to “polarisation” in approaches to security and development and to questioning of the diplomatic basis on which the member states of the Caribbean Community had hitherto pursued these goals. Both analysts and policy makers in the Caribbean have tried to grapple with and resolve the many interrelated questions which were posed so starkly by the events in Grenada.

In order to consider these questions further a workshop on **Peace Development and Security in the Caribbean: Perspectives to the Year 2000** was held in Jamaica, in March 1987. It was co-sponsored by the International Peace Academy (IPA), and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CIIPS) with the co-operation of the University of the West Indies through the Institute for Social and Economic Research (ISER), Jamaica, and the Institute for International Relations (IIR), Trinidad & Tobago. A list of participants is attached in Appendix I.

The workshop was based on the perception that, for the small states in the Caribbean, both the definition and the resolution of their problems are inextricably linked with the effects of the geo-political environment. It was therefore necessary to begin by examining both the external and national environments. The responses of the small states to the range of issues and challenges which derive from their environment, especially in the two areas of diplomacy and security, were then examined by the workshop.

Among the problems which the workshop’s inaugural session



identified were the following:

- How prepared is the region for handling another Grenada?
- What are the defects in the present security arrangements and how can they be corrected?
- Which level of organization can best handle these arrangements, given the small size and poor state of local economies which, in many cases foreclose the options available to the Caribbean?
- Given the fact that sustained development is a precondition for breaking the stranglehold of the problems which afflict the Caribbean, what can be done to ensure that the environment is supportive of small state strategies and policies?
- How can the small states' access to the multilateral financial institutions be increased on terms and conditions which do not generate negative and counter-productive costs?

The document which follows represents a distillation of the ideas which were advanced in the working papers or put forward through interventions. It reflects, in the main, the perspectives of the small states themselves.

The final section attempts to identify the major issues and challenges as well as possible responses to them. It also puts forward a tentative outline of how Canada's role in the Caribbean might be expanded.



## I.

### THE GEO-POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

#### The United States of America

The continued geo-strategic significance of the Caribbean Sea derives from the importance of its sea lanes for commercial and military purposes and its proximity to the United States, which identifies a secure and stable Caribbean as vital to the performance of its widespread global commitments. Thus despite their small size the Caribbean states are thrust into the front rank of US defence objectives.

Whether the roots of US concern be a perception of Cuba as a Soviet surrogate, the withdrawal of the British colonial presence, or the demonstrated interest of the Soviet Union in developing relationships with responsive regimes, the United States has redefined its geo-political space as the "Caribbean Basin". The concept links the Caribbean to Central America and imports into the region, thus redefined, a sense of endemic crisis which may be true of Central America but which is not characteristic of the English-speaking Caribbean. Caribbean policy-makers must cope, therefore, with the perception that vital United States interests are under threat in their area, whether or not they themselves believe this to be the case.

However, the limited diplomatic resources of small states are inadequate for the task of representation in Washington given the complex foreign policy and institutional structures of the United States. These structures were designed for strategic purposes and are not always suitable for dealing with areas such as the Caribbean with its developmental priorities.

The workshop also discussed other problems in the relationship between the small states and the United States. In keeping with the historic development of the Monroe Doctrine, the small states in the Caribbean do not have the option of maintaining close relations with countries looked on as enemies by the United States. While an improvement in relations between the superpowers, and more particularly a rapprochement between the United States and Cuba, would produce an easier political climate in the region, such an improvement would make little difference to constraints on the Caribbean countries' choice of politics and ideology.

Moreover, while the current global situation is still described in Cold War terms, there has been, with the emergence of Japan and the European Community, a fundamental change in the configuration of

power. Unlike the earlier situation, there is now a growing disparity between military power and economic power; the United States has lost its post-war predominance over the international economic system, and despite current rhetoric, protectionist pressures are significant and growing; they could be of great potential damage to the Caribbean states.

Nevertheless, there is in the Caribbean a certain ambivalence in the relationship with the United States. On the one hand, the US is accepted as a guarantor of regional security; on the other, it is perceived as the source of constraints and interventions in matters which are regarded by Caribbean states as part of their sovereign jurisdiction.

### **The Major Regional States**

The major concerns of small Caribbean states in their relations with Latin American countries, especially those of the Caribbean littoral, are likely to revolve around the role the latter can play in the development of security arrangements which would minimize the possibility of regional conflict and perhaps constrain superpower rivalry in the Caribbean area.

Several of these regional powers are now themselves more limited in their ability to assume major leadership roles. Venezuela's financial crisis has resulted in diminished Petro-Bolivar diplomacy. Mexico's leadership aspirations are now almost entirely focussed on the Central American region. Cuba, on the other hand, remains, despite its current economic problems, one of the major factors influencing future events in the region, and its stature permits it to have its own agenda. While the Soviet Union may continue to exploit local or regional crises, it cannot be automatically assumed that Cuban and Soviet objectives coincide, given the complexities of South-South relationships.

As far as security arrangements are concerned, the Organization of American States (OAS) is not at present in the mainstream of dispute settlement and conflict management in the Caribbean. However, with the projected amendment of its Charter to permit the membership of Guyana and Belize and its commitment to the principle of representative democracy, the OAS may provide in the future an important diplomatic forum for CARICOM small states.

The Rio Treaty is perceived in the CARICOM region more as the occasion for intervention than as a source of security, and it therefore attracts little interest and has few adherents.

Such existing sub-regional initiatives as the Contadora Group and the

Lima Support Group, may prove effective models for conflict management because their approach is to dissociate local disturbances from global rivalries. Regional bodies such as the Sistema Economico de Latin America (SELA) could identify areas of common interest, and contribute to the formulation of joint negotiating positions. In this regard, particular attention might be given to widening the Caribbean Development Co-operation Committee (CDCC), a Ministerial Committee established within the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), to include Venezuela, Colombia, Panama and Mexico. Such a widened mechanism could provide a consultative body with integrative potential, which might be more immune to external penetration or pressure than the Committee as presently constituted.

## **Canada**

In a review of Canadian policy towards the Caribbean, undertaken in 1980, the member states of CARICOM were accorded a special relationship with Canada. The review put emphasis on economic co-operation and limited security assistance. Nevertheless Canadian policy towards the region is founded on a fragile consensus of public opinion which sets certain limits to Canadian action and rules out certain options; for example, it has not been possible for Canada to consider the provision of military assistance to Belize, nor to engage in large scale military training programmes.

On the specific issue of military security, Canada has yet to develop an effective bilateral and multilateral strategy for co-operation with those Caribbean governments whose policies have brought them into conflict with the United States. The maintenance of diplomatic, aid and trade relations with such governments will be most effective if those relations are supported by an active foreign policy. While the primary responsibility for formulating prudent policies that reconcile local needs and geo-political realities remains with Caribbean policy makers, Canada could exercise a useful diplomatic role in mediating potential disputes and in interpreting to others the policy imperatives of the Caribbean States.

Since the late 1960s, both Canadian imports from and exports to the Caribbean have decreased to a small percentage of Canadian foreign trade; and there has been a similar decline in Canadian foreign investment in the region. CARIBCAN has recently been established in response to a CARICOM initiative with the aim of providing duty-free access for CARICOM products to the Canadian market. While it is still too early to determine whether this scheme will be effective, it has been criticized for excluding precisely those products, such as clothing,

textiles and methanol, where Caribbean exporters have a significant comparative advantage.

In view of these diminishing economic links, Canadian policies in the region should now be increasingly responsive to other considerations, including the interests of the large Caribbean immigrant communities in Canada. Canada might also reconsider its policies on immigration from the Caribbean, in light of the potential for instability caused by demographic factors. Canada has already played an important diplomatic role in advancing CARICOM priorities in the Caribbean Group for Co-operation and Economic Development (CGCED). It was instrumental in 1985 in securing a temporary reprieve from the World Bank's proposal to graduate these small states out of its arrangements for concessionary funding.

The diplomatic benefits need not lie only on one side. If security is thought of in a less conventional way its relationship with the Caribbean might assist Canada in managing its own asymmetrical relationship with the United States.

## **Europe**

The colonization of the Caribbean by European powers has had profound consequences for the structure of the region, including the creation of open and dependent economies and societies which were the product of racist exploitation.

Present trends indicate that individual European states will withdraw yet further from colonial relationships in the Caribbean, leaving in their wake even more economically dependent (mainly island) states which are intensely vulnerable to external interference. The United States has filled the vacuum left by the departing European powers, and superpower rivalry has been introduced into the region.

Future relations with the former colonial powers will almost certainly be conducted through the European Community, whose aid policies appear to be less predicated on political considerations. The EEC already has important trade and diplomatic links with the Commonwealth, French and Dutch Caribbean, and with Spain now a member, it is expected that the Community will develop stronger links with the greater Antilles. Further, in the institutional structure of the African Caribbean-Pacific Group (ACP), the Caribbean may have at its disposal a mechanism for systematically presenting its political and developmental objectives in a separate context from the periodic renegotiation of the Lomé Convention. The Caribbean may wish in future to increase and diversify its use of the ACP structures in its dialogue with the European Community.

## II.

### THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

#### **Politics and Administration: Issues Related to Stability and Security**

A major source of internal instability is the decline of effective administration. There are mounting expectations for social services at a time when there is decreasing financial and human capacity to provide them. Social tension is intensified by the implementation of structural adjustment measures with concomitant cut-backs in social programmes. Devices such as extra-departmental agencies, which are conceived as being flexible, creative and dynamic, have further exacerbated the situation by responding in the main to ideological and political objectives. Decreasing human resources allocated to the management of state services have impeded the distribution of social services and have also led to increased levels of political and bureaucratic corruption.

There are special risks attached to the management of internal security which may have implications for human rights and the development of democracy. Additionally, in the case of small open economies, internal breakdowns which engender violence and instability can quickly develop an international dimension by providing opportunities for external intervention or withdrawal of support, or for the pursuit of illegal interests, including the increasing use of Caribbean countries as transit points for drug smuggling.

Internal difficulties are therefore a primary source of threat to the stability of the area.

#### **The Demographic Basis of Social Instability**

The main factors which determine the population dynamic in the region are fertility and emigration. Over the next fifteen years reliance on emigration for population control is not feasible. While birth control is effective in much of the Commonwealth Caribbean, with the birth rate falling between 1960-65 and 1980-85 from 5.40 to 3.34, the proportion of the population in the working ages 15-64 is still expected to increase in all of the territories, thus generating an additional demand for nearly a million new jobs between now and the end of the century. This, in effect, will mean that in several countries the rate of unemployment will rise to about 40 per cent by the year 2000. Traditional industries are losing their growth dynamic and cannot be relied upon to provide new jobs. Population growth also affects food



security and availability.

The question which therefore can no longer be avoided is how and where this expanding work force may find employment. Labour absorption problems will have direct repercussions on levels of living, on mobility and on social and political stability throughout the region.

Economic and foreign policy in the Caribbean should now take explicit account of population imperatives. Economic planning must place major emphasis on employment generation. In foreign policy, there is a need for negotiation at the regional level of joint immigration agreements as well as the exercise of greater control over employment policies for export industries.

### **Structural Adjustment and Transformation in the Caribbean**

The structural characteristics of the Caribbean economies are well known: small size and relatively undiversified production structures; lack of adequate professional human resources; lopsided investment patterns and skewed distribution of capital stock reflected in excess capacity; relatively high costs of production; significant foreign control over key sectors; the mismatch of domestic demand with the structure of production or supply; and rigidities in the structure of production arising, at least initially, from the way the Caribbean has been incorporated into the international economy.

The factors which are required to cope with the demands of structural transformation include the ability to monitor overall economic and commercial development in the major industrial countries, to understand the significance of the data received and develop a series of policy options based on such data, and the possession of a theoretical framework to provide the basis for analysis and policy formulation.

The workshop studied the implications of three possible approaches to structural adjustment:

- the “mainstream” approach, which is the traditional IMF approach of demand management, devaluation, wages policy, curbing of money supply;
- the “structural” approach, which puts growth first and pays attention to those real factors which promote or inhibit capital accumulation;
- the “eclectic/pragmatic” approach, which formulates policy that works in the particular circumstances of the country.

Small states are unable to pursue simultaneously programmes of

structural adjustment as usually conceived (mainstream) as well as the longer-term strategy required for job creation. The pragmatic approach was peculiarly suitable to the circumstances of the small, open Caribbean state. There is thus an urgent need to explore alternative approaches, perhaps organised formally at the regional level, which may enable the small states of the Caribbean to implement longer-term strategies with an emphasis on rural development and food production. Such longer-term strategies are particularly important in view of the prospect that in the future large scale emigration may no longer be possible.

The economic dilemmas which confront the small Caribbean state must be understood in a wider context. The mounting debt crisis (the per capita debt burden of some Caribbean countries is now higher than that of several well-known Latin American debtor countries) and the consequent pressures to abandon national planning and development in favour of short-term crisis management including frequent devaluations, whether projected as stabilization or structural adjustment, derive ultimately from the weakness of the global economic and financial systems.

However, in some instances, the structure of Caribbean debt differs from that of Latin America since it is owed to multilateral organizations rather than private institutions. There is a role for the Commonwealth to play here in "softening" debt policy and supporting attempts at debt renegotiation and restructuring.

### **Threats to Nationhood — Erosion of Identity**

The maintenance of identity is of crucial importance, as is self-confidence which can alone provide the basis for undertaking new and innovative forms of development. Threats to the national and cultural identity of the Caribbean small states are legion. In the case of the media, a shared language and geographical nearness has made American electronic media easily accessible with consequent influences on life styles and attitudes. In the area of education, there is a fundamental need for the Caribbean to generate its own knowledge rooted in the specific nature of its own experience; this is a task for which the regional universities are especially fitted.

A further problem is that while the region has recognized the need to enter the "information age", there is a danger that the scientific skill which underpins technological advances may not be transferred sufficiently rapidly, thereby leaving the region dependent on overseas expertise and on supplier agencies.

The Caribbean sense of self had been built on political action; but there

has been little attempt since independence to draw on the collective wisdom and experience, the substratum of values, that resides among the ordinary folk and which could provide a basis for an appropriate approach to development and change.

### **Vulnerability to Natural Disaster**

A factor which is usually ignored when discussing the political economy of small islands (all but two of the membership of the Caribbean community) is the incidence of natural disasters. In the case of one Caribbean island, for example, a hurricane had, in the recent past, reduced its GNP by sixty percent in one night. In addition, the basic security of island communities is often subject to longer term threats arising from forms of development which jeopardize fragile eco-systems, by such unfortunate effects as the erosion of fertile top soil, the reduction of water tables and the contamination of the marine environment.

These dangers should be taken into account in formulating criteria to determine the eligibility of small countries for concessionary funding, especially island states in the Caribbean.

### **Threats to Territorial Integrity**

The threats to territorial integrity in this region derive in the main from historical and geographical factors, particularly border disputes, threats of secession, and the problems of maritime delimitation.

The territorial disputes confronting Guyana and Belize are a carry over from colonial rule. In the case of Guyana, there are now arrangements for economic co-operation with Venezuela and the border controversy has been entrusted to the UN Secretary-General to resolve. In the case of Belize, the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations between Britain and Guatemala has increased the chances of that country's independence and territorial integrity being recognized although, there are as yet no indications that a settlement is near at hand.

Although, the extension of coastal jurisdiction has advanced the security of the small states in certain respects (they are now entitled to regulate and exploit activities in waters adjacent to their coasts), it has also confronted them with the problem of mobilizing resources to police territorial waters. Maritime delimitation likewise poses complex issues because of such factors as the claims of the larger countries in the area to maintain access. The challenge for the Caribbean small state is to work out joint arrangements with the larger countries of the area for negotiating maritime delimitation, while making the necessary arrangements for the exploitation of its own exclusive economic zone.

### III.

## RESPONSES OF THE CARIBBEAN STATES

The responses of the Caribbean states to the problems posed by their external and national environments were examined under the headings, security arrangements and diplomacy.

### Security Arrangements

Perceptions of security needs vary among the small states of the region. Guyana, confronted by Venezuela's claim, aims at achieving security through obtaining diplomatic support especially from developing states, while Belize seeks safety in military arrangements with the United Kingdom; Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago maintain small standing armies. The Bahamas, as an archipelago, has concentrated on a coast guard and similar instruments and, in view of its nearness to the United States, has accepted an American strategic presence in its territory.

On the other hand, the security problems of the eastern Caribbean states which, in many respects, form a homogeneous group, include the protection of numerous bays and inlets. Their view of the problem is also shaped by such occurrences as the secession of Anguilla, the coup in Grenada which brought to power the New Jewel Movement in March 1979, and the uprising in Union Island (a dependency of St. Vincent and the Grenadines) in late 1979. These shared perceptions led to the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding, in October 1982 calling for co-operation in assisting each other in national emergencies, an arrangement in which Barbados, which takes a similar view, also participates. The basic legitimacy of the Regional Security System (RSS) reflects the peculiar security needs of this particular grouping of small island states.

If militarism is interpreted as involving the subversion of civilian values or the military penetration of institutions, there is no sign or semblance of this in the OECS. While there was controversy about the nature of the intervention in Grenada, most CARICOM countries agreed that there was a responsibility to intervene, whether diplomatically or militarily, to secure a resolution of the crisis. If a crisis is not capable of regional resolution, it is not inappropriate to seek assistance from outside the region, as long as it is resolved in a way which does not conflict with the objectives of regional countries. But the question still remains as to whether in the medium to long term more substantial and continuing arrangements can be organized to provide both the institutional and technical bases for self-defence, as well as the

mechanisms for dealing with crisis situations.

## **The Diplomatic Option**

While CARICOM has been remarkably successful in using collective diplomacy to change international systems, (e.g., the proposed New International Economic Order (NIEO)), its member states have been less successful individually in securing support through bilateral diplomacy for their own development objectives. Similarly, the CARICOM countries have been effective in building and maintaining integration movements, at the regional and sub-regional levels, as well as traditional trade and aid relationships. But they have not pursued a coherent or consistent response to the challenge of their geographic location. They have also not yet adequately explored the possibilities for political co-operation with members of the EEC or Canada, in the hope of widening the margin for manoeuvre within the constraints of their geography. Small states over the last decade have recognized that as members of the international community they are primarily responsible for their own security and development. But if their objectives are to be pursued with reasonable autonomy, they need to substitute carefully thought-out and planned approaches in place of *ad hoc* responses to developments in the external environment.

While articles 52 to 54 of the UN Charter call initially for regional solutions to regional conflicts, such solutions have rarely proved feasible. There is a need to develop procedures or institutional mechanisms that would allow the Security Council to utilize regional arrangements more effectively. Such developments would be of particular benefit to small countries whose concerns are frequently overlooked within the existing decision-making framework of the United Nations. Moreover, the recommendations of a Commonwealth consultative group relating to political measures which might be taken at the UN to enhance UN assistance to small states should be followed up. ( See the report, **Vulnerability, Small States in the Global Society**, published by the Commonwealth Secretariat in 1985.)

## **Lessons for the Caribbean From Small States of Other Regions**

In comparing the Caribbean with the South Pacific and the experience of other small states, questions of the maintenance of sovereignty and of security appear to be matters of degree rather than of kind.

Regional co-operation is capable of diminishing vulnerability, increasing control over the economy and reducing the likelihood of external penetration of, or influence over, national policies. While



regional co-operation in both the Caribbean and the South Pacific is sometimes weakened through the pursuit of bilateral relations at the expense of regional action, the South Pacific offers useful lessons about the potential role of middle powers in regional co-operation. Australia and New Zealand, for example, provide resources which favour the regional option over bilateral alternatives.

In another part of the world, the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) provides examples of regional co-operation on specific projects relevant to peace, security and development in contrast with the traditional model of economic integration.

## IV.

### MAJOR ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

As a result of this analysis, a range of issues, problems and challenges confronting the small states of the Caribbean and a number of possible responses were identified.

#### **The Choice of Appropriate Strategies for Development**

Location in a region of geostrategic significance, and one which the US regards as a sphere of influence, exercises an important constraint on the policy choices of small states, both internal and external. It is clearly necessary for any choice of strategy to take account of the special problems which flow from smallness, especially in the case of islands. Yet, those states that have adopted a non-market ideology and rhetoric have been perceived as taking sides in the East-West conflict.

Particular attention should be paid to the fact that growth in such small island states derives not so much from production and investment as from aid as well as such services as tourism and banking.

At present, rapidly rising unemployment, together with hunger and poverty, which are intensified by the inadequacies of the production and distribution system of the small open societies of the Caribbean, are combining in an explosive situation which poses a major threat to stability and security in the region.

#### **Policy Suggestions**

1. Given their geo-political location, small Caribbean states should ensure that their development strategies are perceived to be a response to domestic, not to ideological imperatives.
2. Steps should be taken to ensure that the donor community and international lending agencies understand the peculiar dilemmas of small states and, in particular —
  - (a) their need to pursue pragmatic approaches to adjustment which allow for implementation of strategies both for development and for creating employment;
  - (b) the need to have flexible criteria for concessionary assistance in view of their peculiar difficulties.
3. Given demographic trends, efforts should also be made at the regional level to negotiate immigration agreements.

4. More thought might be given to the selection of new technologies as a basis for alternative export development industries.

### **The Maintenance of Security**

There is evidence that the greater the degree of domestic stability, the less is the vulnerability to external domination or intervention. Accordingly, every small Caribbean country has a primary responsibility to maintain those political and legal procedures which attract popular support. The adequacy of its institutions and, in particular, its institutional capacity for effective administration and distribution of services is crucial.

Since in certain situations these small states have to rely on external assistance for their defence it is important to explore the possibilities of multilateral defence assistance in order to preserve wider regional solidarity.

### **Policy Suggestions**

5. In the pursuit of cohesiveness, closer attention should be paid to means of strengthening democratic institutions.

While the traditional parliamentary system is among the most valued institutions of the region, there appears to be a need in small societies to temper adversarial politics by the establishment of parliamentary committees, including foreign affairs committees, which would emphasize consensus.

Cohesiveness may also require deepening the democratic process through the establishment of more participatory mechanisms at all levels, from field to factory.

There is also a need to give special attention to the full involvement in the development processes of groups which are to a significant extent still marginalized, including, in particular, women. Without the full participation of women, the small Caribbean societies will neglect at their peril the special skills which women in the region have historically demonstrated.

6. Administration is an area in which small states require assistance. However, the transfer of techniques and practices should not endanger established institutional structures and values. The terms for such aid should be carefully considered.
7. To counter secessionist tendencies, there is a need to strengthen or

introduce appropriate democratic arrangements which will facilitate national consensus through increasing the participation of the peoples and groups of unit islands. Programmes of development should aim at overcoming the relative sense of deprivation among such sub-national groups.

8. Systematic research and consultation is necessary before adopting any policy of relying on multilateral assistance for defence. It will be necessary to determine precisely the possible sources of assistance (be they bilateral, regional or at the level of the UN), the value and scope of the assistance which could be made available, and the conditions on which it will be provided. It will also be essential to have a realistic estimate of the extent to which any such pre-arranged multilateral assistance or guarantee is feasible in contemporary international conditions. There is a need for prior political agreement on guidelines as to the situations in which external assistance might be sought, from what sources and on what terms; and on the arrangements which must be put in place so that such assistance will be forthcoming on manageable terms.

### **Maintaining National and Cultural Identity**

The erosion by foreign media and other influences of the national cultural identity of the small open societies of the Caribbean is a continuing threat to their identity.

### **Policy Suggestions**

9. Attention needs to be given to the careful management of nationally-based media so as to ensure the production and usage of national and regionally produced educational, cultural and entertainment material, while still respecting freedom of expression. Such material, it appears, can best result from regional production and exchange. One of the main needs in this area is to develop or upgrade the skills to exploit recent low cost technological developments.
10. Further efforts should be made to build creatively on popular culture and to draw on similar efforts in the "diaspora" communities.

### **Maintaining Regional Solidarity**

Regionalism offers an effective basis for the development of appropriate strategies to deal with the problems of adjustment and development, and for negotiating the organization of security.

At the same time, the regional integration movement is in grave difficulty as a result of the decline in intra-regional trade, and of pressure favouring bilateral relations at the expense of regional commitments. Regional co-operation should not be measured solely in terms of an effective common market. There is need for co-operation in non-economic areas including political integration, and for mechanisms which facilitate the effective implementation of decisions. It was observed that new ideas are emerging amongst the OECS on the possibility of a federated state.

### **Policy Suggestions**

11. Attention should be given to reorganizing the integration movement so as to re-focus its resources and energies on new objectives which should include:
  - (a) strengthening the mechanism for the co-ordination of foreign policies in the management of unequal relations with major states;
  - (b) strengthening political relations with hemispheric middle powers in order to provide support and resources to enhance regional processes and options, and to increase the possibilities of pursuing prudently alternative paths of development.

### **The Diplomatic Option**

The major diplomatic dilemma for small Caribbean countries is how to pursue their objectives within the constraints of their size and location.

Diplomatic influence can be much enhanced if governments act together to pursue common objectives. For example, regional identity and CARICOM solidarity helped to resolve the crisis which had brought the Bishop regime to power in 1979 and, at the level of the OECS, in the creation of the RSS.

Nevertheless, there is need for more prudent foreign policy management based on coming to terms with the realities of power and on expanding relations with appropriate middle powers, with a view to obtaining support for and interpretation of the objectives of Caribbean states.

### **Policy Suggestions**

12. In developing an appropriate diplomatic response, small states should place increased emphasis on co-ordinated action in the management of unequal relations with other powers. Regional



mechanisms which utilize the interest and influence of the major states of the Caribbean littoral may be of importance in advancing such an objective.

13. Moreover, as members of the ACP Group, established under the Lomé Convention, the CARICOM states have opportunities to pursue political co-operation with the EEC.
14. The diplomatic process should be more effectively organized on a regional basis through:
  - (a) monitoring, collecting and analyzing information, especially in the areas of trade, international economic trends and security. The Caribbean small states are at a major disadvantage in view of their limited network of diplomatic missions. Information collection and analysis is identified as an area in which they are in urgent need of assistance: (i) for the selection of information from accessible sources; (ii) for the possible organization of a regional information network.
  - (b) foreign policy planning, to enable the small state to cope with its environment by identifying hazards which should be avoided and opportunities to be exploited,
  - (c) training diplomatic personnel especially in areas of special interest to the small Caribbean state, e.g. promotion of tourism, investment and trade;
  - (d) training in techniques of arbitration, mediation and conciliation, and in the use of confidence-building-measures in regional and extra-regional disputes.

## **International Support**

Until the end of the century, the primary threats to the peace, development and security of the small states are likely to be internal and related to their dependence and underdevelopment.

A majority of the states are islands, with weak institutional structures and insufficient capacity for promoting production or redistribution of gains to a rapidly increasing work force, conditions which can lead to internal unrest and uninvited external intervention.

These problems can be compounded by a lack of external understanding of attempts to pursue unconventional strategies designed to encourage growth, development and security. There is a tendency by aid donors to insist on the pursuit of "pure" strategies, such as a market economy with its primary reliance on the private sector, or "mainstream" approaches to structural adjustment, which may tend to exacerbate existing difficulties in development.

Moreover, the choice of options by policy makers from small Caribbean countries is subject not only to external constraints but perhaps, more importantly, to the ambiguities which derive from the lack of a clear sense of national identity and purpose. While it is increasingly perceived that accommodation with dominant external powers need neither involve total dependence nor defiance, the issue remains one of how to increase standards of living without having to accept levels of dependence that call in question of idea of nationhood itself.

### **Policy Suggestions**

15. While the pursuit of appropriate development and security strategies and prudent foreign policies is the primary responsibility of the small states' policy-makers, external powers, including the middle powers of the Caribbean littoral, Canada and the European Community, can play important supportive roles particularly in the following areas:
  - (a) interpreting, where and when necessary, small state choices of strategies which respond to their domestic imperatives but which might be perceived incorrectly in terms of the East-West conflict;
  - (b) mediating in situations of conflict;
  - (c) providing support for regional options, since these still continue to offer the most effective solutions to the problems of small states;
  - (d) promoting the possibilities for multilateral assistance and providing support, when necessary, of the defence arrangements of the small states especially the OECS States;
  - (e) promoting the provision of aid, whether bilateral and multilateral, on terms appropriate to the circumstances of the small states, especially small islands.
16. International donor agencies should shape their policies so as to enable the small state:
  - (a) to pursue pragmatic approaches to adjustment which will, at the same time, enable them to accelerate development and job creation;
  - (b) to take the best possible advantage of concessionary aid based on flexible criteria which take account of the special vulnerabilities of the Caribbean small state;
  - (c) to reschedule or renegotiate their debts on mutually satisfactory terms.

### **Canadian Support**

17. In terms of the major issues identified above and in view of the fact

that Canadian policy towards the Caribbean has been based on a consensus of public opinion, it appears that there might be room to expand Canada's role in the following areas:

- (a) It could expand its present diplomatic role in support of the security and development objectives of Caribbean small states. Canada, as the major Commonwealth power in the hemisphere, might also wish to consider how to interpret Caribbean objectives to the United States in sensitive areas, and to encourage acceptance of Caribbean strategies which cater to domestic imperatives. In this context, it would be useful to examine existing institutions for co-operation, namely, the Western Hemisphere Commonwealth Conference and the Joint Technical Economic Committee (JTEC) established in the context of the Canada/CARICOM agreement, with a view to making them more politically responsive to perceived needs.
- (b) In view of its own multi-cultural heritage and the prevalence of US media, Canadian experience could be of relevance to the problems which small CARICOM states face in striving to maintain their national and cultural identity.
- (c) Canada already provides some institutional support to the regional movement through small Mission Administered Funds (MAF). The expansion of such direct support and additional regional project assistance, in particular in the area of implementation of regional strategies, could materially assist the regional movement to survive a difficult transition period in which it adjusts to meet the demands of new objectives.
- (d) The further provision of "hands-on" diplomatic and police training of a kind which Canada provided in the post-independence period could meet an urgent Caribbean need. There is, in particular, a requirement for assistance with the development of information and intelligence (information) gathering and analysis, and with foreign policy planning.
- (e) Canada might also wish to expand the kinds of defence assistance which are now provided to some of the states in the region, and in particular accord greater priority to Belize's security requirements in the area of training, in view of that country's expressed wish to diversify sources of military assistance.
- (f) Canada's role in the region could be extended if it were to give support to federal or confederal arrangements that the CARICOM or OECS states may choose to undertake. This support could be diplomatic; perhaps more importantly, however, given Canada's longstanding political and technical experience of confederation, Canada might undertake to

support and advise on initiatives for the promotion of political union or of any other attempt to closer association between the Caribbean small states.

- (g) Canada might also consider the development of a “topping-up” scheme similar to that of the UNDP TOKTEN programme which would make available to CARICOM the expertise of the large Caribbean immigrant community living in Canada, (TOKTEN stands for Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals), and;
- (h) The development of stronger links between Caribbean and Canadian universities and research institutes.

## APPENDIX I

### LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

|                             |   |
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| Mrs. Geraldine S. Kunstader   | Vice President and Director of the Albert Kunstader Family Foundation, New York   |
| Mr. John W. Kunstader         | IPA Board Member and Treasurer; Principal of Kunstader Associates, New York   |
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| Mr. Geoffrey A.H. Pearson        | Executive Director, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa  |
| Maj. Gen. Indar Jit Rikhye (Ret) | President, International Peace Academy, New York   |
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| Ms. Laura-Ann Munro       | Institute of Social and Economic Research, UWI, Kingston                              |
| Mr. Edward Newman         | Economist, CARICOM Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana                                    |
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| Mr. Jim Webb              | Pastor, St. Peter Claver Church, Kingston   |
| Mrs. Judith A. Wedderburn | Project Officer (Research & Education), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation, Kingston |
| Mr. Lesley B. Whatley     | Curator, Barbados Museum, St. Michael, Barbados                                       |

## **WORKSHOP SECRETARIAT**

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| Mrs. Zetta Allison-Bird | Coordinator, ISER                   |
| Ms. Anne Denvir         | Coordinator, IPA                    |
| Ms. Betty Davis         | Assistant to the Coordinators, ISER |
| Ms. Donnette Dwyer      | Assistant to the Coordinators, ISER |
| Ms. Corinna Lewis       | Assistant to the Coordinators, IPA  |
| Mrs. Sharon Thomas      | Assistant to the Coordinators, ISER |



## **APPENDIX II**

### **DESCRIPTION OF SPONSORING INSTITUTIONS**

#### **International Peace Academy**

The International Peace Academy, which has its headquarters in New York, is a unique non-profit institution founded in 1970 for the purpose of providing practical mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts. The IPA is wholly transnational in its board of directors, programme, staff, and publications. The main activities of the Academy are in developing and conducting training seminars in peace-keeping, peace-making and crisis management; off the record meetings between disputing parties to facilitate their discussions; publication of reports and books which identify policy options for resolving conflicts. The IPA has earned a solid reputation and credibility with all parties to conflicts, and has a wide network of international contacts and support.

#### **The University of the West Indies**

- Institute for Social and Economic Research, Mona, Jamaica;
- Institute for International Relations, St. Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago.

Founded in 1948 and now the oldest regional institution in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the University of the West Indies has for nearly four decades provided scholarly research on national and regional challenges confronting the Caribbean and has contributed many of the seminal studies which have led to the creation and continued growth of the Caribbean Community. Its campuses are in three countries; Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, with extra mural departments in the non-campus territories of the Eastern Caribbean.

The two institutes which co-hosted this meeting, the ISER and IIR are both regional “think tanks”, the former on socio-economic issues, the latter on regional foreign policies and security questions. The ISER is now also the headquarters of the Consortium Graduate School of the Social Sciences. The IIR which is an autonomous institution affiliated to the University of the West Indies and funded by regional governments undertakes both scholarly research and diplomatic training for the constituent countries of the Community, and other Caribbean countries.

#### **The Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security**

The Institute, which is located in Ottawa, was created by an act of Parliament in June 1984 with a mandate to increase knowledge and understanding of the issues relating to International Peace and Security from a Canadian perspective.

The Institute is a Crown Corporation; it has a Board of Directors of seventeen comprised both of Canadian and international specialists in peace and

security, and a permanent staff of twenty-five. It publishes a quarterly magazine, background papers on current issues, and academic analyses. It also makes grants to organizations pursuing research and education in the area of its mandate.

### APPENDIX III

#### OPENING STATEMENT BY THE HONOURABLE JEANETTE R. GRANT-WOODHAM, MINISTER OF STATE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAMAICA, 22 MARCH 1987

Mr. Chairman

Members of the Diplomatic Corps, Participants, other Distinguished Friends,

Allow me to add my own words of welcome to those already expressed by the Acting Vice Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, Professor Leslie Robinson. This Workshop has brought together a formidable collection of experts on Caribbean issues, whose intellectual energies and capacity are guaranteed to make this a memorably successful "think-tank". We are particularly pleased that a Workshop of this nature is being held in Jamaica and congratulate the co-sponsors on this initiative. A special welcome is extended to our friends — both co-sponsors and participants — from overseas, for whom I hope that your time here will be effectively and enjoyably spent.

You have all come expecting much from this Workshop and I believe that its important objectives will be attained. The structure of the programme, the themes to be covered and the acknowledged high level of expertise of the participants, are my basis for this belief. I also believe that this Workshop has a tremendous potential for making a significant contribution to the policy formulation and review process of governments in this region and may well have an impact on decision-making in other capitals.

The "Caribbean Basin" is a term subject to as many definitions as there are interests in the sub-region. The Initiative which bears that name excludes a few countries of Central America and the Caribbean. Some Latin American views on the "Cuenca del Caribe", include all island states plus those mainland states bordering on the Caribbean Sea. The Regional Environment Programme, for obvious reasons, covers the "Cuenca del Caribe". However, if one may judge from its programme, this Workshop will highlight the small states of the Caribbean, in particular the Commonwealth Caribbean. My statement will therefore reflect that slant.

Caribbean perspectives to the year 2000 and beyond are inescapably founded in the realities of today. We are a number of newly independent, western oriented states spread across thousands of miles of sea, sharing a common colonial past; the socio-economic problems endemic to the Third World; a commitment to democratic principles and institutions; and a thirst for development for the benefit of our peoples and societies. Integrationist policies find expression in our Caribbean Community whose fortune fluctuates in tandem with its members' perceived national interests. In multilateral organizations, particularly the United Nations, we have exercised influence and participated at levels beyond our small size as we strive to

maximize the benefits (including bilateral) which accrue from membership of these bodies. We have sought to diversify and extend the levels and scope of our bilateral relations for improved access to markets, to satisfy other development needs and in keeping with the principle of good-neighbourly relations between states, but are often impeded by financial constraints.

Geopolitical realities of the Caribbean Basin now might not be significantly changed by the year 2000. It is to be hoped, though, that the crisis which threatens Central America and from which tension and instability could radiate to — or be perceived as affecting — the Caribbean, will be peacefully resolved before then. Despite the recognized socio-economic roots of the crisis in Central America, one cannot ignore the complexities introduced by the East-West conflict. Nor can one ignore the constraints imposed by that conflict on the formulation and implementation of foreign policy by the Caribbean Basin states whose strategic location heightens their significance to external powers. Ideological and systemic differences with neighbouring Cuba and concern about communist infiltration therefrom; political instability in some Caribbean island states and territories and the dependence of all Basin States on external metropolises are other inescapable factors of our geopolitical environment which impact on our policies.

Security concerns are not limited to these factors, though much concern has been expressed in some quarters about the ease with which governments of small states could be sabotaged or overthrown through mercenary action or externally supported rebel or dissident groups. The days are past when it was true to say “this could never happen in the Commonwealth Caribbean”. Yet it is not possible for our fragile economies to sustain military forces, equipment and installations for adequate response to such perceived threats. In this context, the concept of regional co-operation in the security field might satisfy some interests and needs. Other security problems arise from the abuse of and illicit trafficking in drugs, which are serious problems for several Caribbean states, Jamaica included. Already our countries have recognized the need for international co-operation to eradicate this grievous social malady and its dangerous international tentacles.

Equally, our governments have recognized the need for sustained development as a pre-condition for breaking the stranglehold of the problems which afflict the Caribbean Basin. They recognize that in development lies the key to sovereign action determined only by national interest and in keeping with internationally accepted principles. Development reduces dependence which in turn allows foreign policy flexibility. Sustained growth and development removes the threat of instability and the threat to local democratic institutions which could result from socio-economic deprivation and despair.

So we adopt strategies and orient our policies to attain development objectives. But these efforts take place in a rapidly changing environment which could negate or at best weaken our thrust. The impact of rapidly advancing technology and changes in the international economic environment are a specially severe challenge to small states, which are more

vulnerable to change. Included in this ever-changing environment are the changing demand for commodities; the application of trade barriers and protectionism by developed countries even while they insist on action by us to improve our economies; the nature of the global financial market; the rapidly advancing forms of information exchange and communication. Development strategies must respond to this changing environment. Our countries have to be able to adapt quickly if our economies are not to suffer further recession and if our growth objectives are to be met.

What, then, should be our development priorities to the year 2000? While not daring to proclaim a prescription for our region, I can say that in general terms, the adjustment process must be continued. Our emphasis has to be on higher productivity and the use of appropriate technology for increased efficiency and to generate greater trade flows. The expansion and improvement of the productive base and concomitantly, a reduced dependence on imports, are a *sine qua non* for our development. We must also improve our capacity to attract and sustain investments, both local and foreign. This requires the adoption and implementation of long-term policies to maintain and increase confidence. All this requires domestic and regional stability.

However, it would be unrealistic to expect investments alone to provide the financing necessary to fuel these engines of growth and socio-economic development. What of aid? Academicians have written about the aid and dependency link. Governments have experienced it. But as my Prime Minister said in his address to the Special Session of ECLAC held in Mexico last January, "If aid plugs the gaps while we gather strength, we can adopt that objective as a practical goal of development strategy". The prospects for increased aid flows may be gloomy, but we must continue to seek the best possible terms and conditions for aid.

So too must we seek to increase our access to the multilateral financial institutions under terms and conditions which do not generate negative and counter-productive social costs. It is becoming increasingly evident that debtor countries cannot deal with their individual debt problems in isolation from the experiences of each other. A debtor's cartel is obviously not the answer, but we must collaborate if these institutions are to become more sensitive to our adjustment problems.

Without peace and security the best strategies for development must fail. Thus a priority must be resolving the socio-politically divisive problems which engender violence and instability. Civil and political rights must be unswervingly respected and to the full extent permitted by our economies; economic, social and cultural rights must be guaranteed and enjoyed by all our peoples. This must be so since our ultimate objective should always be ensuring the welfare of our peoples.

Our foreign policy should continue to reflect the principle of good-neighbourly relations with all states, of our region in particular, as well as with powers with influence in our region on the basis of mutual respect and



confidence, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and other principles of the United Nations. We must stress the need for a peaceful negotiated resolution of conflicts, including those within our region. We must give continued support to initiatives such as that of Contadora, which seek a regional, peaceful solution to minimize or obviate the risk of a cold war impact on the conflict. While seeking to benefit from arrangements for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, we must strive for universality of adherence to, and respect for, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Caribbean basin states need also to demonstrate greater interest in disarmament questions.

Two specific disputes in which our countries are particularly interested, remain unresolved. I refer to the territorial disputes between Belize and Guatemala; Guyana and Venezuela. Current indications are that the prospects are good for their peaceful resolution by the year 2000. However, we must not relax our concern that these disputes be so resolved as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Diplomatic Corps, Participants and other Distinguished Friends,

I have sought to give a brief overview of these issues which will be dealt with at greater depth in this Workshop, more to whet the appetites of the participants than to direct their thoughts. May I close by offering my best wishes for the complete success which this Workshop deserves and express the hope that the conference document will live up to our expectations.

Thank you.







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